The Possibility of Altruism

The Possibility of Altruism
Princeton University Press | ISBN: 0691020027 | 1979-03-01 | File type: PDF | 150 pages | 6 mb
quot;The Possibility of Altruismquot; is a classic revival of Kantian ethics in the later twentieth century. Written early on in Nagel's career, it establishes his now-famous distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons, and argues that each agent-relative reason necessarily has an agent-neutral correlate. Furthermore, Nagel believed that these correlates bring along the initial motivational content of the original agent-relative reason, and transmit that content to other actors by virtue of their generalized format.

While interesting, the attempt is widely regarded mostly as a failure, including by Nagel himself - because of a convincing rebuttal from Nicholas Sturgeon, and concerned commentary by Samuel Scheffler and Phillip Petit. The most significant flaw in the argument seems to be Nagel's imprecision in how motivational content is generalized, and what motivation is provided to other actors. Nonetheless, this work marks the beginning of Nagel's attempts to argue that morality is derived from the tension between the subjective first-person perspective, and our ability to somehow see things more objectively, from a third-personal scientific perspective. type: PDF.html

[Fast Download] The Possibility of Altruism

Ebooks related to "The Possibility of Altruism" :
A Critical Introduction to Testimony
Kant in the Land of Extraterrestrials: Cosmopolitical Philosofictions
Science and the Enlightenment (Cambridge Studies in the History of Science)
The Cambridge Companion to Liberalism (Cambridge Companions to Philosophy)
Hart on Responsibility (Philosophers in Depth)
Proper Ambition of Science
Learning from Six Philosophers(Volume 2)
Kant's Doctrine of Right: A Commentary
Stephen Lalor - Matthew Tindal, Freethinker: An Eighteenth-century Assault on Religion
A Survey of Metaphysics
Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.